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Contemplating Masterpiece
Cakeshop
Terri R. Day* and Danielle Weatherby**
Abstract
Next term, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, the Supreme Court will consider whether a
baker’s religious objection to same-sex marriage justifies his
violation of Colorado’s public accommodation law in refusing to
bake a cake for a same-sex wedding. At the centerpiece of
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a clash between the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause or, more precisely, the principles of equality in
commercial life as grounded in Colorado’s public accommodation
law. In exploring the purpose inherent in regulating private
conduct through public accommodation laws, this Essay suggests
that the reconciliation of these seemingly irreconcilable interests is
rooted in their common intrinsic value: maintaining the social
order. Ultimately, Masterpiece Cakeshop provides an opportunity
for the Court to reclaim the grounding principles inherent in public
accommodation laws that recognize the civic duty in “serving the
public” and hold that free exercise must bow to equal protection
when necessary to maintain the social order.
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I.

Introduction

On the two-year anniversary of its historic same-sex
marriage decision, which extended the fundamental right to marry
to same-sex couples,1 the Supreme Court announced it would hear
a case that takes center stage in an ongoing battle between
religious liberty and LGBT rights.2 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,3 Jack Phillips, a selfdescribed “cake artist,” appeals a Colorado decision4 finding him
liable for sexual orientation discrimination under the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act5 (“CADA”) for refusing to bake a wedding
cake for a same-sex couple.6 Phillips invoked the First Amendment
in arguing that the State’s application of CADA to his case,
essentially compelling him to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex
wedding in contradiction of his deeply-held religious beliefs,
violated his free speech and free exercise rights.7 The Colorado
*
Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; LL.M.,
Yale University (1995); J.D., University of Florida (1991); M.S.S.A., Case Western
Reserve University (1976); B.A., University of Wisconsin, Madison (1974).
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law; J.D.,
University of Florida Levin College of Law (2005); B.A., Franklin and Marshall
College (2002). Our deepest appreciation goes out to Jen Hosp who worked
tirelessly to put the finishing touches on this Essay.
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, No. 16-111, 2017
WL 2722428 (June 26, 2017) (granting certiorari).
3. Id.
4. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015).
5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2012).
6. See Craig, 370 P.3d at 279 (“We conclude that the act of same-sex marriage
is closely correlated to [plaintiffs’] sexual orientation, and therefore, the ALJ did
not err when he found Masterpiece’s refusal to create a wedding cake for
[plaintiffs] was ‘because of’ their sexual orientation, in violation of the CADA.”).
7. Id. at 284–288.
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Court of Appeals rejected his claim, holding that his compliance
with CADA “merely require[d] that [he] not discriminate against
potential customers . . . and that such conduct, even if compelled
by the government, is not sufficiently expressive to warrant First
Amendment protections.”8
At the heart of Masterpiece Cakeshop is a question
implicating the collision of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
or, more precisely, the principles of equality in commercial life as
grounded in Colorado’s public accommodation law. As such, the
Court will be forced to reconcile the competing values and legal
tests embedded in these constitutional rights. The question the
Court will consider next term juxtaposes the individual rights of
the claimants with the individual rights of the shop owner:
Whether
applying
Colorado’s
public
accommodations law to compel the petitioner to
create expression that violates his sincerely held
religious beliefs about marriage violates the free
speech or free exercise clauses of the First
Amendment.9
While this case requires the Court to resolve more precise
First Amendment questions concerning compelled speech and
artistic expression, this essay attempts to disentangle the broader
legal issues at the centerpiece of cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop
that pit religious exercise against LGBT rights. In doing so, one
thing is clear: the Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop will
provide important insight into its predisposition toward future free
exercise cases that pose an even closer question because they are
strengthened by the presence of robust religious freedom laws.
Indeed, Masterpiece Cakeshop provides an easier case for
LGBT rights to triumph over the free exercise rights of business
owners than other cases percolating their way up through the
8. Id. at 286.
9. Petition for Writ of Certiori, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n,
No.
16-111
2017
WL
2722428
(July
22,
2016),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/16-111-cert-petition.pdf.
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federal courts. While CADA strengthens the same-sex couple’s
claim by expressly prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation, many state and local public accommodation laws do
not include sexual orientation under their protective umbrella, and
the Equal Protection Clause does not afford heightened protection
to individuals claiming sexual orientation discrimination.10
Conversely, since Colorado lacks a state Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”), Phillips could not invoke Hobby Lobby11
to support his argument that strict scrutiny judicial review is the
appropriate standard to apply to his free exercise claim, even if,
contrary to his position, CADA is a neutral law of general
applicability.
Hypothetically, had Colorado lacked CADA’s express
protection for sexual orientation and also had a state RFRA
mandating strict judicial scrutiny of free exercise challenges,
Phillips’ claim would be much stronger. The confluence of the
presence of these realities in other cases seems to forecast a legal
landscape that secures religious liberties at the sacrifice of civil
rights.
This essay proceeds in two parts. First, it recognizes the
values inherent in regulating private conduct through public
accommodation laws. It argues that since the Fourteenth
Amendment was never intended to prohibit private
discrimination,12 it should not now be used to permit it. Second, it
examines the important justification for governmental restriction
of free exercise: when such restriction is in the interest of the social

10. See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality:
Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1015, 1047 (2016) (explaining how LGBT-protective
non-discrimination laws are diminishing due to the proliferation of state
preemption laws that prohibit municipalities from passing non-discrimination
ordinances that exceed the state’s existing coverage).
11. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 22 (2014). Although Hobby
Lobby involved the federal RFRA, it sets the precedent for businesses, invoking
state RFRA laws, to refuse services to LGBT patrons based on religious beliefs.
12. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883) (holding that Congress had
no “direct and primary” authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to enact legislation regulating private race discrimination).
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order.13 Ultimately, the essay suggests that the reconciliation of
the seemingly irreconcilable clash between the guarantees of free
exercise and equal protection is rooted in their common intrinsic
value: maintaining the social order. Masterpiece Cakeshop
provides an opportunity for the Court to reclaim the grounding
principles inherent in public accommodation laws that recognize
the civic duty in “serving the public” and hold that free exercise
must bow to equal protection when necessary to maintain the
social order.
II. The Law of Public Accommodation and the Wedding Cake
Conundrum
The law of public accommodation finds its roots in early
English common law. Joseph Singer’s No Right to Exclude: Public
Accommodations and Private Property outlines the evolution of the
theory of public accommodation law.14 Dating back to sixteenth
century England, where early case law required innkeepers to
admit guests if the inn was not already full, the concept of what we
now understand as public accommodation law was based on the
premise that “one that has made [a] profession of a public
employment is bound to the utmost extent of that employment to
serve the public.”15 Famous English Judge Lord Holt described the
common-law duty to serve the public without discrimination as an
absolute responsibility bound inextricably in the “profession of a
trade which is for the public good.”16
Without using the term “public accommodation,” Lord Holt
seemed to imply that individuals serving in “public employment”
had a duty to serve the public without discrimination.17 A
subsequent English case defined “public employment” as one “in
which the owner has held himself out as ready to serve the public
13. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding that a criminal
polygamy law comported with the First Amendment because it punished conduct,
not beliefs).
14. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1303–1411 (1996).
15. Id. at 1305 (citing White’s Case, 2 Dyer 343 (1586)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
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by exercising his trade.”18 According to Singer, the principle that
an innkeeper who “induce[s] people to think that he is a common
innkeeper . . . is bound as such to receive those who offer
themselves” emanates from the appearance of being open to the
public.19 In essence, the businessman that held himself out to serve
the public was thus obligated to serve the public.20
The contractual principles supporting the duty to serve the
public indiscriminately made their way into American
jurisprudence during the antebellum period.21 As Singer recalls,
several prominent American legal scholars reiterated the “holding
out theory,” requiring innkeepers and carriers of goods to serve the
public if they held themselves out to serve the public.22
Today, places of public accommodation “are those
intrinsically hybrid entities that are private as against the state
yet simultaneously open to the public.”23 While it is now customary
for Congress to prohibit private discrimination in places of public
accommodation, such was not always the case. Well over a century
ago, the Supreme Court struck down portions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 and held that Congress did not have the express power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit private
discrimination.24 The Court limited the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment to state action only and held that Congress had no
“direct and primary” authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to prohibit race discrimination by private actors.25
Seventy years later, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States,26 the Court held that Congress possessed ample power
18. Id. (citing Gisbourn v. Hurst, 91 Eng. Rep. 220 (K.B. 1710)).
19. Id. at 1311 (citing FREDERICK CHARLES MONCREIFF, THE LIABILITY OF
INNKEEPERS (1874)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826); JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS, WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE
CIVIL AND THE FOREIGN LAW (1832); THEOPHILUS PARSON, LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1853); FRANCIS HILLARD, THE LAW OF TORTS (1859)).
23. Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market
Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1592 (2001).
24. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4 (1883).
25. Id. at 20.
26. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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under the Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
prohibiting private discrimination in places of public
accommodation.27 The Court recognized that innate in the
Commerce Clause power is the power to regulate not just
interstate but also intrastate commerce that has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce and defined public accommodations
as establishments with “operations [that] affect commerce.”28
Thus, private discrimination in public accommodations could be
prohibited under Congress’s broad Commerce Clause powers.29
Since Heart of Atlanta, Congress has invoked its Commerce Clause
powers in enacting laws that regulate private conduct in places of
public accommodation.30
Admittedly, Masterpiece Cakeshop involves state law, and
the power of states to regulate their citizens’ private conduct is
much broader than the scope of congressional authority limited by
the enumerated powers doctrine.31 States enjoy general police
powers, which the federal government does not.32 Nevertheless,
Heart of Atlanta firmly established that private discrimination is
not outside the reach of even Congress’s limited and expressly
defined power to regulate.33

27. Id. at 245–46.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 276–77.
30. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
277–80 (1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, which regulates private lands, as a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce
Clause powers); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155 (1971) (upholding the
Consumer Credit Protection Act, which criminalizes private conduct, as a valid
exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 299–301 (1964) (upholding Congress’ power to prohibit race
discrimination in small, private restaurants as a valid exercise of its Commerce
Clause powers).
31. See United States. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566, 603 (1995) (holding that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was unconstitutional because it did not have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
32. See id. (discussing the constitutional limitations of the federal government’s
legislative authority).
33. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261–262 (upholding the relevant
provisions of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 because they are limited to
“enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of
goods and people”).

CONTEMPLATING MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP

93

The link between discrimination in public accommodations
and commerce is well-documented. Indeed, studies document the
negative economic effects of LGBT discrimination in places of
public accommodation,34 and the daily headlines report anecdotal
evidence of consumer boycotts and canceled concerts or sporting
events in protest of states’ anti-LBGT policies.35
Considering the early roots of public accommodation laws
and the well-recognized link between discrimination against
patrons and negative economic effects, the Commerce Clause and
state police powers are the appropriate sources of governmental
authority to regulate private discrimination in public
accommodations.
In addition to its limited scope to regulate private conduct,
the Fourteenth Amendment has provided little protection to LGBT
persons from official government discrimination.36 Although the
LBGT community rejoiced after Obergefell, that case and previous
ones striking laws targeting the LGBT community have not
provided heightened protection for LGBT members as a class
under the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, Obergefell secured the
liberty interests inherent in the right to marry as protected by
substantive due process.37 The unfortunate reality of the Court’s
measured decision is that same-sex couples can get married in the
morning, lose their jobs in the afternoon, and be evicted from their
apartments all on the same day. Because the Constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause provides scant anti-discrimination protection for
LGBT persons, state and local anti-discrimination laws are critical
for protecting LGBT civil rights—by prohibiting both public and

34. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 293 (Colo. App. 2105)
(citing MICH. DEP’T OF CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON LGBT INCLUSION UNDER
MICHIGAN LAW WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 74–90 (2013),
http://perma.cc/Q6UL-L3JR) (discussing the negative economic effects of antigay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender discrimination in places of public
accommodation).
35. See Day, supra note 10, at 1063 (discussing the trend of LGBT-inclusive
businesses boycotting states with overly-expansive religious freedom laws).
36. See id. at 1029–1031 (examining the evolution of legal protections for the
LGBT community).
37. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (holding that the
fundamental right to marry includes the right to same-sex marriage).
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private discrimination.
The Supreme Court has not wavered from its early
interpretation that enforcement of rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment requires state action. In Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Phillips relies on the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, to
escape the anti-discrimination dictates of CADA.38 In essence,
Phillips argues that Colorado’s application of CADA to him is the
“state action” required for invocation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As such, judicial enforcement of CADA violates his
free exercise rights guaranteed under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and Colorado or the court should excuse compliance
and legitimize his private discrimination of patrons based on
sexual orientation. This argument fails for two reasons.
First, CADA does not target, implicate, or encroach on
religious exercise. Only laws that “target the religious for ‘special
disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status’” implicate the Free
Exercise Clause.39 This is not a case that “imposes a penalty on
the free exercise of religion” by “denying a generally available
benefit solely on account of religious identity.”40 In its most recent
Free Exercise case, the Supreme Court said that a religious school
could not be prevented from “compet[ing] with secular
organizations for a grant” solely because it was church affiliated.41
If religious affiliation does not justify the exclusion from a secular
benefit, it cannot also justify the exclusion from compliance with a
secular obligation. This manipulation of the law, by which Phillips
is attempting to avail himself, is the ultimate “having your cake
38. See Petition for Writ of Certiori, supra note 9 (arguing that the State of
Colorado’s application of CADA to him, requiring him to bake a cake for a samesex couple, violates his First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion
without government intrusion).
39. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 2012, 2019
(2017); see also Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (PAREN),overturned due to legislative action, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(b)(b) (1993) (holding that the State of Oregon could deny
unemployment benefits to an individual terminated from employment for using
peyote, even though such use was part of a religious ritual).
40. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 628 (1978) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 215 (1972)).
41. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 137 S.Ct. at 2015.
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and eating it too” contradiction.
Second, a court-sanctioned “pass” allowing Phillips to
violate CADA by refusing to serve same-sex couples might open
the floodgates, allowing all business owners to invoke religious
freedom as a pretext to discriminate against LGBT patrons in
public accommodations. The carving out of exceptions in LGBTprotective public accommodation laws or the legitimization of such
discrimination through application of robust state RFRA laws may
constitute state action that violates the Federal Equal Protection
Clause or a state equivalent. It is well-settled that states cannot
discriminate against a class of individuals based on animus alone,
even under a more liberal rational basis review.42 Governmentsanctioned conduct that makes an entire class “unequal to
everyone else” is never a legitimate government purpose.43
The Colorado Court of Appeals correctly determined that
CADA is a neutral law of general applicability subject to rational
basis judicial review. In contrast, Phillips argues that the
application of CADA is replete with individualized exceptions;
therefore, rejection of his religious objection targets religion and
requires application of strict scrutiny. Phillips erroneously equates
his blanket refusal to bake all wedding cakes for same-sex couples
based on their status with refusal to bake a specific cake for an
individual because of its odious message. This argument conflates
what he asserts here – the right to deny a service to an entire group
of patrons based on their membership in a particular class, which
violates CADA—with the right to refuse to bake a cake with a
morally reprehensible message, which is permissible.44 Just weeks
ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that there is no Free Exercise

42. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a Colorado
constitutional amendment prohibiting any government entity or court to extend
anti-discrimination protections based on sexual orientation violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. 39 (1997) (holding that an
attorney’s blanket refusal to represent a potential client because he was male
violated Massachusetts public accommodation law, whereas attorneys may
exercise discretion, consistent with ethical rules, in refusing to represent a
potential client, as long as the decision is not predicated on a wholesale refusal to
serve an entire class of individuals).
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concern when “the laws in question have been neutral and
generally applicable without regard to religion.”45 CADA does not
single out Phillips or any business owner for disfavored treatment
based on religion.
Since the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment is that it was never intended to prohibit private
discrimination, it should not now be used to permit it. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court should reaffirm its longstanding precedent
that the Fourteenth Amendment is neither a shield nor a sword
when private conduct is at issue.
III. Free Exercise of Religion and the Social Order
Jack Phillips’ assertion of religious freedom as a justification
for refusing to bake a cake for same-sex partners Charlie Craig and
David Mullins is a prime illustration of the palpable backlash felt
across the nation to the Obergefell decision and other emerging legal
protections for the LGBT community. Opponents of marriage
equality are increasingly asserting their own religious beliefs to
justify discrimination against LGBT members in public
accommodations and other public arenas.46 The invocation of the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and both the federal RFRA
and state mini-RFRAs pits free exercise against equal protection,
creating a dynamic that could lead to government-sanctioned
discrimination which, in the aggregate, could result in the
systematic unequal treatment of LGBT individuals.47
In fact, three years ago, the Court denied certiorari in Elane
Photography v. Willock,48 a case with a similar fact pattern to
Masterpiece Cakeshop. When a New Mexico photography company
refused to photograph a patron’s same-sex commitment ceremony
in the name of religious freedom, the patron sued, claiming that
Elane Photography violated the New Mexico Human Rights Law’s
45. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., 137 S.Ct. at 2015.
46. See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini RFRA: A
Return to Separate but Equal, 65 DePaul L. Rev. 907, 919–923 (2016) (describing
the efforts of conservative lawmakers to pit religion against LGBT rights,
including the proliferation of robust religious freedom laws).
47. See id. at 926–927 (describing anecdotal evidence of businesses increasingly
denying service to same-sex couples in the name of religious freedom).
48. 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1787 (2014).
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prohibition
against
sexual
orientation
discrimination.49
Ultimately, the patron’s civil liberties prevailed, trumping the
business owners’ invocation of the First Amendment.50
Elane Photography spelled the start of a new era—an era
in which the LGBT community would find itself unfairly pitted
against an increasingly-conservative religious community. The
tension caused by such a division grew as a slew of similar cases
arose and left many throughout the country in further dissension
over the issue of LGBT civil rights vis-à-vis businesses’ religious
beliefs and practices.51
Although New Mexico did not have a state RFRA on the
books at the time, the conflict in Elane Photography foreshadowed
the potential real-life impact of an overly-protective state RFRA
that compelled strict scrutiny judicial review over laws that
purportedly violate an individual’s religious freedom. With all of
the cards stacked in favor of religious freedom and no express antidiscrimination protections for same-sex patrons, a court
considering the same case under an overly-expansive mini-RFRA
may very well have found in favor of Elane Photography.
But longstanding First Amendment principles open the
door to governmental restriction of free exercise when a religious
practice is against the social order. Indeed, as early as the late
1800s, in its first Free Exercise case, the Supreme Court discussed
the government’s interest in preserving the social order.52 In
upholding an anti-polygamy statute that allegedly violated the
Mormon duty to practice polygamy, the Court distinguished
between religious belief and religious practices and opined that
government could restrict “actions which were in violation of social
49. Id. at 59.
50. Id. at 77 (holding that New Mexico’s enforcement of its human rights law,
which compelled a photographer to photograph a same-sex wedding, did not
violate the First Amendment).
51. See, e.g., State of Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5 2015
WL 720213, at *3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015) (holding that a flower shop
owner discriminated against patrons on the basis of sexual orientation in
violation of State law when she refused to provide flowers for their same-sex
wedding).
52. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding a criminal
polygamy law that punished conduct, rather than belief, that was “in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order”).
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duties or subversive [of] good order.”53 This principle was
reaffirmed over a century later when the Court dismissed a free
exercise challenge to the state’s denial of unemployment
compensation benefits to persons who ingested peyote in violation
of the state’s criminal laws.54 Although peyote use was part of the
Native American Church’s religious ceremonies, the Court rejected
the argument that a religious motivation could excuse conduct
proscribed by a valid criminal law which did not specifically target
the religious practice.55
Like the Reynolds Court a century before, the Smith Court
recognized that the exercise of religion involves not only belief and
profession but “the performance of (or abstention from) physical
acts.”56 While religious beliefs are beyond the reach of government
regulation, actions are not. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, where
Phillips claims a religious motivation excuses his compliance with
the anti-discrimination mandates of CADA, the values inherent in
enforcing public accommodation laws and restricting religiouslymotivated discrimination go hand in hand. A governmental
sanction of private discrimination is against the social order.
Finally, most scholars and jurists attempting to reconcile this
clash between religious exercise and equal protection have focused
their analysis on the strength of the Fourteenth Amendment, levels
of judicial scrutiny, and the fundamental rights inherent in the First
Amendment.57 While Phillips’ First Amendment claims in
53. Id. at 164.
54. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (reaffirming
Congress’ power to regulate criminal conduct that affects interstate commerce
and is “subversive of good order”).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 872.
57. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Moving Targets: Obergefell, Hobby Lobby, and the
Future of LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1 (2015) (examining the
competing interests inherent in the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Kyle C. Velte, All
Fall Down: A Comprehensive Approach to Defeating the Religious Right’s
Challenges to Antidiscrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing
that state anti-discrimination laws should trump state RFRAs and opining that
anti-discrimination laws do not compel speech in violation of the First
Amendment); M. Katherine Baird Darmer, “Immutability” and Stigma: Towards a
More Progressive Equal Protection Rights Discourse, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 439 (2010) (examining the immutability component of the suspect class
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Masterpiece Cakeshop do not receive heightened scrutiny pursuant to
a state RFRA, the courts will continue to encounter cases that
confront the intersection between free exercise and equal protection.
Many of those future claims will be strengthened by the power of the
RFRA’s strict scrutiny mandate behind them. In our article, The Case
for LGBT Equality: Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and
Repurposing the Dormant Commerce Clause, we propose an
alternative analytical framework that links private discrimination in
public accommodations to the Commerce Clause.58
When Jack Phillips and other business owners successfully
invoke religious freedom laws as a justification for refusing to serve
LGBT customers, the government is essentially acquiescing to
discrimination. As the Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged,
public accommodation laws “prevent[] the economic and social
balkanization prevalent when businesses decide to serve only their
own ‘kind,”’ and ensures the uninhibited flow of intra- and interstate
commerce.59
One of the reasons the Framers discarded the Articles of
Confederation and designed a whole new constitutional framework
was to empower a strong federal government to regulate interstate
commerce.60 The adverse economic effects caused by private
discrimination in public accommodations are measurable.61
Moreover, state approval of this type of discrimination has
substantial, negative effects on interstate commerce and encroaches
on federal powers to regulate interstate commerce. Indeed, states
that acquiesce to discrimination by enabling religious objections like
Jack Phillips’ will suffer economic losses as people and businesses flee
analysis and arguing that it should be abandoned for purposes of equal protection
doctrine and its impact on the LGBT community).
58. See Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The Case for LGBT Equality:
Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1015 (2016).
59. Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 293 (Colo. App. 2105).
60. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–326 (1979) (stating that “[t]o
regulate Commerce . . . reflected a central concern of the Framers that was an
immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention”).
61. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 293 (citing MICH. DEP’T OF CIVIL
RIGHTS, REPORT ON LGBT INCLUSION UNDER MICHIGAN LAW WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 74–90 (Jan. 28, 2013), http://perma.cc/Q6ULL3JR (detailing the negative economic effects of anti-gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender discrimination in places of public accommodation)).
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to more LGBT-friendly environments,62 resulting in economic
barriers or creating commercial balkanization.63 Ultimately, statesanctioned private discrimination in public accommodations will
affect interstate commerce, which raises potential Dormant
Commerce Clause concerns.
Admittedly, the doctrinal fit may not be as seamless as the
traditional doctrinal analysis, and federal courts may be reluctant
to apply the Dormant Commerce Clause to constitutional
challenges like the one at issue in Masterpiece Cakeshop. But this
proposed framework removes the issue from the Fourteenth
Amendment and the battle between religion and equality. Instead,
it reframes the issue, focusing on state laws that are used to excuse
compliance with anti-discrimination mandates and exclude LGBT
individuals from equality in commercial life. A robust national
economy supported by the free flow of people and goods in
interstate commerce is a strong rationale for judicial application of
62. Big businesses such as Walmart, Target, and Apple have recently threatened
to boycott states adopting robust religious freedom laws that would shield
businesses from public accommodation laws if they withheld goods or services
from same-sex couples. See generally Tim Evans, Angie’s List Canceling Eastside
Expansion
over
RFRA,
INDYSTAR
(Apr.
2,
2015,
11:38
AM),
http://www.indystar.com/story/money/2015/03/28/angies-list-canceling-eastsideexpansion-rfra/70590738/ (last visited July 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Jeremy Stoppelman, An Open Letter to States Considering
Imposing Discrimination Laws, YELP (Mar. 26, 2015, 5:52 PM),
http://officialblog.yelp.com/2015/03/an-open-letter-to-states-considering-imposingdiscrimination-laws.html (last visited July 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review) Claire Zillman, Salesforce Boycotts Indiana over Fear of LGBT
Discrimination, FORTUNE (Mar. 26, 2015, 4:51 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/03/26/
salesforce-indiana-same-sex-law/ (last visited July 19, 2107) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Other mega-corporations like American Airlines,
Facebook, Nike, General Mills, Google, The Dow Chemical Company, and Levi
Strauss have expressed their support for the proposed Equality Act of 2015, which
would prohibit discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and gender identity.
Tom Huddleston, Jr., Google Joins Chorus of Companies Backing LGBT Bill,
FORTUNE (July 28, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/28/google-equalityact-lgbt/ (last visited July 19, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
63. See C&A Carbone, Inc .v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383, 390
(1994) (stating that the Commerce Clause is intended to prevent “economic
protectionism: and insure the free movement of goods between state borders,
prohibiting “laws that would excite . . . jealousies and retaliatory measures”
among the states).
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the Dormant Commerce Clause to these types of claims.64
Ultimately, sensible-minded Americans might be more amenable to
recognizing that the free flow of people and commercial activity in
interstate commerce is more supportive of our national interests than
a cultural war about traditional family values.65
IV.

Conclusion

Masterpiece Cakeshop is the first of what will likely be a
litany of cases that force the Court to confront the thorny
intersection between religious exercise and public accommodation
laws. While the precise question before the Court in Masterpiece
Cakeshop involves a multi-layered analysis of First Amendment
doctrine, the larger context reveals an ongoing battle between the
assertion of business owners’ free exercise rights and the rights of
LGBT patrons to indiscriminate service in places of public
accommodation, strengthened by the existence of state and local
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.
Future cases that pose this conflict will likely require the
Court to reconcile this clash of liberty interests while struggling
with the application of a RFRA’s strict scrutiny mandate to free
exercise challenges. The resolution of these competing interests
will be undoubtedly arduous. But where these two interests seem
at odds and perhaps irreconcilable, the Court should examine a
shared value.
In their embryonic stage, American public accommodation
laws were born out of the “holding out” theory. That theory
suggests that where a business owner holds herself out to the
public as open for business, she should serve the public
indiscriminately. The evidence supporting the link between
discrimination in places of public accommodation and negative

64. See id. (same).
65. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589–90 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the
motivation behind Colorado’s amendment 2 as a “Kulturkampf”).
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economic effects is substantial.66
Against this backdrop, the Court has been resolute in
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress
power to regulate private conduct. In circumventing this
limitation, Congress and the states have enacted laws regulating
private conduct in public accommodations under their Commerce
and state police powers, respectively. Here, Phillips mistakenly
argues that Colorado’s application of CADA to him, forcing him to
bake a cake for a same-sex couple in violation of his free exercise
rights, is the “state action” required for invocation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Any holding that legitimizes this
argument would amount to government-sanctioned private
discrimination. Certainly, if the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be
used to prohibit private discrimination, it should not now be used
to permit it.
Ultimately, the reconciliation of what at first glance
appears to be irreconcilable liberty interests can be achieved by
unearthing their mutual purpose. Common to both the regulation
of private discrimination through public accommodation laws and
the governmental restriction of free exercise in favor of equality in
commerce is an important, if not vital, public purpose:
maintenance of the social order.67 Since judicial approval of
Phillips’ refusal to serve a same-sex couple would essentially make
the government complicit in a form of private discrimination, and
a government sanction of private discrimination is against the
social order, the Court must affirm the Colorado Court of Appeals’
decision. This holding would set the precedent for more robust
religious freedom cases that are armed with a RFRA and reaffirm
the longstanding principle that free exercise must bow to equal
protection when necessary to maintain the social order.
66. See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 293 (Colo. App.
2105) (citing MICH. DEP’T OF CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON LGBT INCLUSION UNDER
MICHIGAN LAW WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION 74–90 (Jan. 28,
2013), http://perma.cc/Q6UL-L3JR (detailing the negative economic effects of
anti-gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender discrimination in places of public
accommodation)).
67. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878) (explaining that a
criminal polygamy law, which restricted a religious practice, was necessary to
maintain the social order).

